This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here.
Soft power is a country’s ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce. In practice, soft power allows countries to project their values, ideals, and culture internationally to foster goodwill, enhance security, and strengthen long-term partnerships.
Australia has long been a beacon of cultural appeal, democratic values and educational excellence—these elements have formed the bedrock of Australia’s soft power in the post-war era.
However, Australia’s soft power rankings have shown a clear downward trend over the past decade. Ranking 6th in 2015 in the The Soft Power 30 index, Australia slipped to 10th in 2019 and to 14th by 2023 in Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index.
This steady decline has profound implications for Australia’s role and security in a region where non-coercive power is increasingly critical.
For example, Edelman’s Trust Barometer highlights the overall decline in Australia’s trust levels in Southeast Asia: Australia was marked as one of the biggest losers on the index between 2021-2023, consistently landing in the distrust category with low scores between 1-49 out of 100.
This reflects a serious issue for Australian diplomacy in the era of global power competition in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia must improve its soft power diplomacy to secure its regional influence and security before it is too late.
Canberra’s shifting priorities in the region
Recent years have seen an extra grim budgetary outlook for Australia’s existing federal avenues that support soft power.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has massively shrinking funds, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) has seen an A$526 million (US$357 million) reduction in funding since 2022, and tightening visa policies is expected to affect educational diplomacy with tertiary institutions projecting an A$310 million revenue shortfall in 2024.
While the Albanese government has pushed for financial boosts in certain areas, the overall budgetary environment is abnormally pessimistic. Why has this happened?
One explanation is that in the wake of Australia’s prolonged economic downturn and soaring debt following Covid-19, Canberra’s policies have increasingly prioritized domestic issues.
Faced with an expected gross debt of A$598.5 billion for the fiscal year ending June 2024, the government has needed to redirect funds towards pressing domestic concerns such as healthcare, economic stimulus, infrastructure, and social services.
With elections nearing, this fiscal realignment is also likely driven by the need to focus on policies that directly impact people’s lives to maintain voter approval. Yet despite these fiscal constraints, defense spending has surged.
The government has allocated a record A$36.8 billion to defense in the 2024-2025 budget, marking a 6.3% increase from the previous fiscal year.
This boost in defense expenditure reflects a return to hard power, in response to increasing geopolitical tensions and strategic imperatives of AUKUS over the next decade. Considering all factors, Australia has, unfortunately, pushed public diplomacy to the back burner.
These trends are troubling. However, it is also important to recognize Australia’s soft power efforts have always been relatively meager.
Unlike the British Council (1934), the Japan Foundation (1972), and the Korea Foundation (1991), Australia has never established an international cultural agency. Since the end of World War II, Canberra has prioritized economic and strategic interests over soft power, preferring to channel funds into areas directly tied to national interests, such as defense and trade.
John McCarthy (former Ambassador to Indonesia) noted that public diplomacy has consistently been the weakest aspect of Australian foreign policy, and “Canada invests more in public diplomacy than Australia allocates for its entire foreign service.”
That said, Australia’s soft power decline stems from more than just budgetary restraints. Controversial policies on Indigenous rights and asylum seekers, perceived inaction on climate change, inconsistent approach to human rights issues, restrictions on freedom of expression, and disputes over environmental management have all complicated our global image in the region.
As a middle power with limited resources in our arsenal to advance our national interests, a concerted effort to prioritize soft power projection through public diplomacy should be central to Canberra’s foreign policy.
Addressing the problem
First, Australia needs to better leverage its national assets by creating more pro-Australian leaders in the region through international education. For many years, international education was one of Australia’s triumphs in public diplomacy.
The country’s higher education system is globally renowned for its quality and inclusiveness, attracting global talent from nations including China, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and more. In 2023, eight of Australia’s top ten source countries for international students were from Indo-Pacific nations.
Therefore, investing in international education not only builds a positive image of Australia abroad but also fosters generations of pro-Australian young leaders. Alumni of Australian universities often return to their home countries to occupy influential positions in government, business, and civil society, therefore serving as informal ambassadors who advocate for Australian values and policies within the region.
For instance, as Beijing ramps up policy and security assistance to Fiji and Papa New Guinea, investing in pro-Australian leaders is crucial for maintaining regional stability and promoting democratic principles, transparency, and sustainable development.
However, Australia’s reputation in international education has taken a hit following the recent tightening of visa policies. This has led to the rejection of over 50,000 international applications between November 2023 and February 2024, and as visa rejections reach record-high numbers, students are seeking educational opportunities elsewhere.
This is a step in the wrong direction, opening the door for competing regional nations to attract students who might have otherwise come to Australia. While Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil emphasizes the need for curbing migration levels, this approach has significant long-term consequences for Australia’s educational diplomacy and, by extension, public diplomacy.
There must be continued efforts to balance migration while restoring Australia’s reputation as a leading educational destination. One potential solution is to adopt a program similar to Canada’s Student Direct Stream, which would attract global talent and streamline visa processes for international students from key Indo-Pacific countries while sustainably manage migration levels.
Second, redirecting financial resources into public broadcasting to restore Australia’s international media presence should be a top priority for Canberra.
As Australian Strategic Policy Institute senior fellow Graeme Dobell writes, “Until the last decade, Australia was the pre-eminent international media voice in the South Pacific, as we had been since World War II.”
What was once a media presence comparable to CNN and the BBC in the 1990s has now disappeared. In fact, Canberra’s continued efforts to withdraw resources from Australia’s broadcasting company (ABC) in an “unfocused” and unstrategic manner is odd, given existing evidence that international public broadcasting is still a powerful tool in promoting public diplomacy in the 21st century.
Many of our regional competitors have also shown persistent growth in their media influence through continued financial investment by their governments, such as China’s CCTV and Japan’s NHK.
In comparison, the ABC’s budget is now among the smallest globally, a situation that must be urgently addressed. Australia’s international voice cannot be rebuilt without substantial financial backing from the Australian government.
This additional funding must be implemented strategically. Much of the ABC’s original content over the last decade has been geared towards Australian viewers, a situation driven by persisting financial constraints.
As expected, rebroadcasting this type of content in the Pacific has had very limited effect because it lacks the necessary language and cultural relevance for regional viewers.
To address this challenge, the ABC must prioritize creating content that resonates with the varied interests, languages, and cultures of Indo-Pacific audiences. China’s achievements in multilingual programming and content diversification offer a compelling example.
By enhancing our media capabilities, Australia can better shape perceptions, boost visibility, and strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific audiences.
Australia’s decline in soft power is cause for concern. Despite gradual efforts to improve it, our progress has not been rapid enough to remain competitive with other fast-growing regional competitors.
If Australia wants to protect its national security interests in a region with a shifting balance of power, Canberra must improve its soft power projection to avoid falling irreversibly behind.
Helen Wu (rw2904@nyu.edu) is an Emerging Leader at Pacific Forum and a senior at New York University majoring in International Relations.
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