Over the last 25 years, the U.S.-India relationship has changed considerably. While not an alliance, today it is a deep partnership, including in the defense and security domains. Structural factors have driven the two countries to cooperate across the administrations of presidents as different as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. The relationship is not without divergences, which currently include India’s partnership with Russia and U.S. policies in parts of South Asia. But if they are managed, if the strategic convergence between Washington and Delhi persists, and if India once again adapts its approach according to a new administration’s priorities and preferences, then this cooperation will continue and possibly even increase.
The view from Washington
Washington has had a broader strategic rationale for investing in ties with New Delhi. Successive administrations have seen India as a growing power that offers opportunities for various U.S. stakeholders, and whose choices—for good and bad—will affect American interests.
More particularly, the United States has perceived India through the prism of the ongoing competition in the Indo-Pacific. Washington considers India to be a contributor to regional deterrence in the context of China’s increased assertiveness, and—at different times and to different degrees—a geopolitical counterbalance, economic alternative, a more trusted technology partner, and a democratic contrast to China.
New Delhi broadly shares Washington’s vision of the region, and crucially, the sense that a rising China’s assertive behavior is the critical challenge to it. Moreover, sometimes even more so than some American allies, India has been willing to work with the United States to respond to this and other regional challenges, especially in the defense, economic security, and technology domains.
Today, there is greater U.S.-India consultation (including on regional security), cooperation, interoperability, and information sharing than there used to be. These have been facilitated by various diplomatic, defense, security, and technology dialogues and the signing of foundational agreements after years of negotiations. The two countries’ military exercises have increased in number, frequency, and sophistication, and include an annual maritime exercise with Australia and Japan and participation in each other’s minilateral and multilateral exercises. Their defense trade and technology ties have been supplemented by defense industrial collaboration; start-up cooperation in the defense, space, and emerging technology sectors; and maintenance, repair, and overhaul agreements. The U.S. interest in this is partly that a more capable India would not just be able to deter China at its borders but also be a key security provider in the Indian Ocean region—one that is willing to burden-share.
Moreover, it has been helpful that India, for its own reasons, is partnering closely with several American allies and partners in the region, including Australia, France, and Japan. Through its security and economic cooperation, India is also helping build countries’ capabilities and resilience even beyond the Indian Ocean region, e.g., the Philippines and Vietnam. Furthermore, New Delhi has been supportive of minilateralism—including the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the Mineral Security Partnership—despite Chinese and Russian pushback. And it has been more willing to speak out against unilateral changes to the status quo or the use of force in the East and South China seas and the Taiwan Strait.
The view from New Delhi
New Delhi’s theory of the case for investing in the U.S.-India partnership has broadly been complementary. Indian policymakers have seen the United States as crucial to achieving their objectives: security, economic and technological transformation, and a greater role on the world stage.
In terms of external security, a top concern for New Delhi has been an increasingly assertive China, whose footprint has grown in India’s immediate and extended neighborhood. A critical Sino-Indian capabilities gap (China’s economy is about five times larger than that of India) has complicated India’s ability to deal with its bilateral, regional, and global differences with Beijing.
This has made partnerships indispensable—and the United States has been useful for New Delhi’s China strategy in several ways. Washington has bolstered India’s internal balancing by enhancing Indian capabilities and resilience. And the United States has served as an external balancer by contributing to a favorable balance of power and influence in the region, by providing strategic and economic alternatives to countries in the region, and by supporting India during crises with China.
In addition, India has leveraged its partnership with the United States as it has sought to address other regional security challenges, including terrorism (particularly from Pakistan-based terrorist groups) and maritime security concerns in the western Indian Ocean region (leading New Delhi to join the U.S.-led, multinational Combined Maritime Forces).
Recent cooperation and challenges
The United States and India are currently working on or have recently announced several new agreements. In the defense and security domains and the Indo-Pacific region, these include the establishment of an Indian Ocean dialogue, the recent signing of a Security of Supply Arrangement, an agreement to assign liaison officers, India’s planned acquisition of 31 MQ-9B drones, negotiations to co-produce fighter jet engines and other military equipment, and consultations for a reciprocal defense procurement agreement. Moreover, there are several initiatives stemming from the national security advisor-led Initiative for Critical and Emerging Technology and the recent Quad ministerial and expected summit later this month—including the expansion of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.
While strategic convergence has led to this cooperation, the U.S.-India relationship does not lack divergences and risks. Washington’s discomfort with New Delhi’s partnership with Moscow only intensified after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India, in turn, continues to watch the U.S. relationship with Pakistan warily. In South Asia, while India has recognized that cooperating with the United States and other like-minded partners can be useful (e.g., in Sri Lanka), there have also been limits due to differences (e.g., over Bangladesh). Globally, India’s desire to serve as a “voice of the Global South” has at times been useful for the United States—as a non-China, non-Western option—but it can also create friction if, in that role, India adopts an anti-Western tone.
There are persisting differences in the economic relationship as well, including trade barriers and uncertainty about the Indian business environment. Constraints related to immigration policy have hindered greater advancements in economic and people-to-people ties. A new complication is the increase in the number of undocumented Indians trying to enter the United States. The United States and India have also sparred over domestic issues, with U.S. officials and observers conveying concern about the state of Indian democracy and liberalism, and Indian officials demanding non-interference in India’s internal affairs. Over the last year, a more serious challenge has been U.S. accusations about an Indian government employee’s involvement in a murder-for-hire plot in the United States. New Delhi, for its part, has expressed frustration about separatist calls from some members of the Indian diaspora in the United States.
The road ahead in a new U.S. administration
Specific recommendations will depend on the next president’s priorities and sense of India’s role in them, as well as the next administration’s approach to India and other partners (strategic or transactional), policies toward China and Russia, and view of America’s role in the world.
Regardless, one task for American and Indian policymakers will be to tackle the differences mentioned above, whether resolving or managing them. If not, they have the potential to complicate or constrain the cooperation that strategic convergence makes possible.
As—or even more—important will be maintaining the forward progress across various domains in the relationship. Momentum has somewhat slowed in certain areas because of both countries’ elections and other preoccupations. The U.S.-India partnership is more “natural” than it has been in the past, but it still requires nurturing—particularly at the high level.
The next administration should assess what has worked—and what has not—in the partnership. This should include evaluating existing mechanisms before giving in to the temptation to replace them with new ones.
It would also be advisable for the next administration to identify its goals and discuss them with India, while also seeking to understand New Delhi’s objectives. Unrealistically high expectations are unhelpful but having indifferently low expectations risks leaving opportunities on the table. Instead, the new administration should approach ties with pragmatic ambition.
Finally, the next administration (and its transition team) will have to watch potential developments between now and inauguration day that might have an impact on U.S. interests. These include possible crises (India-China, India-Pakistan, vis-à-vis Bangladesh), a potential Sino-Indian tactical thaw, and India’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts.
Continuity or change from New Delhi’s perspective
Meanwhile, India will be keeping a close eye on the U.S. election campaign and its outcome. New Delhi will care about a future U.S. president’s bilateral approach to India, as well as the sustainability of minilateralism (and especially the Quad). But, given India’s own competition with China and the extent to which strategic convergence has driven U.S.-India cooperation and incentivized the management of differences, Indian policymakers will also care deeply about the next administration’s China policy—which they hope will remain competitive.
More broadly, their questions about a potential Kamala Harris administration will revolve around how much continuity or change there will be from the Biden administration in terms of policy and personnel. In particular, New Delhi will want to see how her administration prioritizes the Indo-Pacific; the approach to China; the willingness to deepen cooperation with India in the security, economic, and technology domains; and how much a Harris administration will focus on the values pillar of the relationship and, specifically, internal developments in India.
If Donald Trump is reelected in November, India will hope that his first-term competitiveness with China and focus on the Indo-Pacific will return. New Delhi likely believes that Trump would bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a speedier end and hopes that he would not focus much on the state of Indian democracy and human rights. But New Delhi will be concerned about a second Trump administration’s volatility and transactionalism. In particular, there will be uncertainty about Trump’s China approach—the possibility of him seeking a deal with Xi Jinping—and his commitment to working with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. On the economic front, India would worry about potential tariffs, a U.S. economic approach that focuses more on reshoring or nearshoring rather than friendshoring, and increased American reluctance or a higher price for technology sharing or development finance. Finally, India would be adversely affected by a Trump administration that might impose constraints on high-skilled visas or international student programs, or put pressure on India because of the higher number of undocumented migrants traveling from there.
At the end of the day, however, the importance of the U.S. relationship for New Delhi means it will seek to work closely with whichever candidate makes it to the White House. And it will adjust its approach based on the result of the elections—not just vis-à-vis a new administration, but potentially toward other major and middle powers as well.
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